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In today's era of budgetary constraints, the military
Services are being pressured to procure non-developmental or
"off-the-shelf" equipment for use. This thesis is a case
study of a non-developmental system, the Marine Corps' Light
Armored Vehicle-25 (LAV-25) . The decision to quickly
acquire this non-developmental system was motivated by the
urgent need for the Marine Corps to have a vehicle of this
type to support their mission as a rapid deployment force.
Combining a non-developmental system and an accelerated
acquisition strategy produced a near-term focus that lacked
sufficient consideration for long-term logistics support.
This thesis identifies the inability to competitively
reprocure spares and repair parts and the lack of a post
production support plan as the two most serious problems in
the fielding of the LAV-25. The lessons learned are that
competitive spares reprocurement and post production support
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This thesis is a case study of the logistics support
problems of the United States Marine Corps' Light Armored
Vehicle-2 5 (LAV-2 5) program. The LAV-2 5 program has three
distinct attributes which make it of interest. First, the
LAV-25 program was characterized as non-developmental. It
was planned as, essentially, an off-the-shelf acguisition.
Second, the LAV-25 was an accelerated acguisition. Only 18
months elapsed between award of the LAV-2 5 production
contract and the first fielding of the vehicle. Lastly, the
LAV-25 is a large and complex weapon system. While off-the-
shelf acguisition may be well-suited for simple commercial-
use items, the use of off-the-shelf acguisition for large
and complex weapons systems such as armored combat vehicles
can produce serious logistics support problems.
B. OBJECTIVE
Numerous studies have been done documenting the
logistics problems of developmental programs. Few studies
have been done documenting the logistics difficulties that
can arise in non-developmental programs. The LAV-25 program
provides an opportunity to do the latter.
The objective of this thesis is not to reach specific
solutions to LAV-25 logistics support problems. Rather, it
is to define and examine the significant logistics support
issues associated with an important non-developmental
program in order to recognize and understand the logistics
planning problems that can be encountered in the accelerated
acquisition of a complex non-developmental weapon system.
C. SCOPE
Although the LAV-2 5 experienced many logistical "growing
pains" the author has chosen to focus on what he believes to
be the two most significant difficulties encountered:




Much of the information for this thesis was obtained
from the organizations involved in the LAV-2 5 program.
These organizations were: the Armored Combat Vehicle Branch
of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quant ico,
Virginia, the LAV Weapons System/Equipment Manager and the
Contracts Directorate at the Marine Corps Logistics Base,
Albany, Georgia, and the LAV Program Manager at the Tank-
Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan. Other literature
sources included the Naval Postgraduate School Library, the
Defense Logistics Systems Information Exchange, the Defense
Technical Information Center and various Department of
Defense directives.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter II
provides a history and background of the LAV-2 5 accelerated
acquisition, the logistics measures used to support the
accelerated acquisition process, and the logistics problems
and corrective initiatives employed in the program. Chapter
III provides an examination of the classification of the
LAV-25 as non-developmental. Chapter III also focuses on
competitive reprocurement issues associated with off-the-
shelf items as evidenced by the LAV-25. Chapter IV provides
conclusions and recommendations describing the key lessons
learned from the LAV-2 5 program.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter has four purposes. The first purpose is to
explain the need for, and the history behind, the
accelerated acquisition of the LAV-25 by the United States
Marine Corps. Emphasis is placed on identifying why an
accelerated acquisition strategy was adopted and on
contrasting the LAV-25 acquisition process with a normal
acquisition cycle. The second purpose is to identify the
significant and unique Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
measures required to support the accelerated fielding of the
LAV-25. The third purpose is to identify the significant,
unanticipated support issues arising from the accelerated
LAV-25 fielding. The final purpose of this chapter is to
evaluate the corrective measures taken to alleviate LAV-25
ILS difficulties.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
The LAV-25 is the principal vehicle and weapon system of
the LAV family of armored combat vehicles. The LAV-25 was
the first vehicle of the family fielded by the Marine Corps.
Other LAV variants fielded subsequent to the introduction of
the LAV-25 include the Logistics (LAV-L) , Anti-Tank (LAV-
AT) , Mortar (LAV-M) , Recovery (LAV-R) , and Command and
Control (LAV-C2) variants. The Air Defense (LAV-AD) and
Assault Gun (LAV-AG) variants are currently undergoing
development. All vehicles in the LAV family share the
following common characteristics and capabilities:
Rapid transportability by both air and surface means.
LAVs are transportable by C-130, C-141 and C-5 aircraft
and by CH-53E helicopter. LAVs are compatible with
U.S. Navy amphibious ships and landing craft.
Eight-wheeled vehicle capable of four-wheel or eight-
wheel drive.
- Same basic steering assemblies, suspension, power train
and engine.
- Similarly configured ballistic armored hull protection.
- All LAVs have a swimming capability. LAVs are capable
of crossing bodies of water with low sea states, such
as lakes and rivers. LAVs cannot negotiate open ocean
and surf, such as would be reguired in an amphibious
assault.
However, it is the particular mission, and associated
weapons configuration assigned to carry out that mission,
that makes each LAV variant unigue. The LAV-25 primary
weapon system is the M242 Bushmaster 25 millimeter chain gun
cannon. The secondary weapon system is a pintle-mounted
M240E1 7.62 millimeter machine gun. The LAV-25 also carries
two M257 smoke grenade launchers to provide battlefield
masking. The LAV-25 carries a crew of seven (Vehicle
Commander, Assistant Vehicle Commander/Gunner, Driver and
four scout infantrymen)
.
LAV-2 5s are found within the Light Armored Infantry
(LAI) Battalion 1 of each Marine Division. Doctrinally, the
primary mission of the LAI Battalion is [Ref. 1]
:
To conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of force
operations in support of the Marine Division or its
subordinate elements and, within its capabilities, conduct
limited offensive or delaying operations that exploit its
mobility and firepower.
Essentially, the LAV-25 performs an armored reconnaissance
mission. To accomplish this mission, the LAV-25 must be
capable of engaging and defeating similar armored combat
vehicles while providing armored protection for the vehicle
crew. The LAV-2 5's principal advantages are its speed,
mobility and rapid fire support. Its principal disadvantage
is its light armor protection which makes it susceptible to
larger-than-small arms direct fire weapons and anti-armor
weapons.
C. ACQUISITION HISTORY
In the early 1970 's, the Marine Corps recognized its
warfighting ability was significantly diminished by [Ref. 2:
p. 3343]:
Reduced availability of Naval Gunfire support.
Increased enemy air capability.
'Previously named the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion
Loss of the 3.5 inch rocket launcher, the 106
millimeter recoilless rifle, and the Ontos 2 from the
weapons inventory.
Numerous Marine Corps studies identified the solution to
this reduced capability as a mobile armored weapon system
providing maneuverability and direct fire support for ground
forces. This armored weapon system came to be known as the
Mobile Protected Weapon System (MPWS)
.
In 1979, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)
was formed to improve the nation's military capability to
respond quickly to world crises. The U.S. Army, along with
the Marine Corps, identified the need to enhance RDJTF
forces with an armored weapons system capable of rapid
response. The Congress agreed that the Army and the Marine
Corps lacked sufficient armored mobility and firepower for
RDJTF purposes and considered this shortcoming to be a very
serious deficiency. In testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Subcommittee on Research and Development regarding
Rapid Deployment Force Programs, Senator Gary Hart stated
[Ref. 2:p. 3177]:
An effective Rapid Deployment Force should have two
characteristics. First, it should be capable of rapid
strategic mobility, so as to respond in a timely manner to
a crisis. Second, it should have an adequate tactical
mobility so as to fight effectively once it arrives on the
scene of a crisis. Currently, we have few, if any, forces
which combine these two characteristics.
2The Ontos was a tracked, armored, assault and anti-
tank vehicle with six 106 millimeter recoilless rifles
mounted on its chassis.
Senator Hart concluded his testimony with the following
recommendation [Ref. 2:p. 3180],
Mr. Chairman, I strongly recommend a program to move
immediately to acquire a family of light armored vehicles.
Further, I suggest it be a Marine Corps, rather than Army
or joint program. . . .The immediate need is a Marine Corps
need and it should be filled by a Marine Corps program.
The RDJTF mission, combined with the Iranian hostage
situation, the diminished Marine Corps assault capability
and the growing public awareness of the need to modernize
the armed forces, created, in the early 1980 's, a political
climate very favorable for the acquisition of such a system.
However, the MPWS, as a new design, would require six to ten
years before reaching full-scale production and operational
deployment [Ref. 2:p. 3344]. Because of this perceived
urgent need, emphasis was placed on quickly acquiring a
light armored weapons system that would, as much as
possible, meet MPWS requirements while meeting RDJTF
purposes. The MPWS, as a separate long-term acquisition,
was expected to be available in the late 1980' s.
The Department of Defense (DOD) was directed by the
Senate Armed Services Committee to procure an armored
vehicle of the same design for the Army and the Marine Corps
with production to begin in Fiscal Year (FY) 1982 [Ref. 3:p.
183]. To meet this requirement, an off-the-shelf
acquisition strategy was adopted.
In December 1980, the Marine Corps established its
Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a Light Armored
Vehicle. This ROC specified a goal of 1983 for achieving
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) . IOC is defined as
[Ref. 4]:
The first attainment of the capability to employ
effectively a weapon, item of equipment, or system of
approved specific characteristics, and which is manned and
operated by an adequately trained, equipped and supported
military unit or force.
On May 8, 1981, the Secretary of Defense approved the
Mission Elements Needs Statement (MENS) for the Light
Armored Vehicle program. This key document provides the
core of the Light Armored Vehicle acquisition strategy. It
contains the Secretary's direction to the Army and Marine
Corps and defines the accelerated nature of the program by
stating, "Every effort will be made by both Services to
expedite delivery of this urgently required system." A copy
of the MENS is included as Appendix A. Key requirements of
the MENS include:
Tailoring the acquisition process to meet a planned IOC
of 1983.
Designating the LAV as a non-major system.
Requiring a joint Army and Marine Corps acquisition to
acquire one system which satisfies the needs of both
Services.
Designating the Army as the contracting agency with
acquisition responsibility for the program.
Requiring the Program Manager (PM) to be a Marine
Officer.
Requiring a Product Improvement Program (PIP)
.
As a result of the Secretary's guidance, the Army and the
Marine Corps agreed to the establishment of a joint program
office at the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) , Warren,
Michigan.
With the Secretary's approval of the Marine Corps' 1983
IOC goal, the Army and Marine Corps faced the requirement to
proceed from Milestone to Milestone 3 and IOC in
approximately two years. This necessitated combining the
Concept Exploration, Concept Demonstration and Validation,
and Full-Scale Development Phases of the acquisition process
into one very short 24-month phase. This fundamental
consideration drove all acquisition plans. Essentially, the
accelerated LAV acquisition effort required reducing the
normal six-to-ten years needed to reach full-scale
production to two years. To accomplish this, the following
acquisition strategy was developed:
Conduct a market survey to identify manufacturers with
the ability to produce an off-the-shelf item capable of
fulfilling the operational requirements of the ROC.
Select four candidate vehicles for testing.
Select the best of the four candidates to receive the
production contract.
Procure the required number of LAV's through a five-
year contract.
The acquisition strategy contained two phases. Phase I
comprised the market survey and testing of off-the-shelf LAV
candidates capable of being modified to meet Marine Corps
requirements. Phase II comprised the production and
deployment phase.
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In April 1981, the Phase I Request for Proposal (RFP)
was released. Included in the Phase I RFP was the
definitive requirement for the LAV to be an off-the-shelf
acquisition. Off-the-shelf was defined as follows [Ref . 5]
:
The offeror must have previously produced the vehicle, the
vehicle is commercially available, and the vehicle is
substantially composed of components which are in
commercial or military in-service use. Notwithstanding
this "off-the-shelf" requirement, an offeror must also be
able to meet the following requirements: Deliver test
vehicles as specified 60 days after the contract award;
meet the technical and performance requirements specified
in this RFP; and possess the capability and capacity to
produce and deliver, in the configuration required, the
first year vehicle production requirements.
Phase I contracts were awarded in September 1981 to three
firms for four test vehicles. These were:
TABLE 1
LAV PRODUCTION CONTRACT COMPETITORS
FIRM










Commando V3 00 6x6
LAV-25 8x8
Candidates were to be evaluated based on Technical,
Performance, Cost and Production abilities. Competitive
testing of the LAV candidates took place between 1 November
1981 and 31 May 1982. On 27 September 1982, Detroit Diesel
General Motors (DDGM) of Canada, through Canadian Commercial
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Corporation (CCC) , was awarded a Firm Fixed Price with
Economic Adjustment contract to produce the LAV-25 for the
Army and the Marine Corps.
Subsequent to award of the LAV-2 5 production contract,
the Army reviewed and reconsidered its requirement for the
LAV. Revised operational requirements for the Army's Liqht
Infantry Division, combined with budqetary constraints,
caused the Army to terminate its portion of the LAV proqram
on 29 December 1983. Some LAVs contracted for Army
procurement were transferred to the Marine Corps. The
initial Marine Corps LAV-25 acquisition profile (number of
production starts per year) , and final profile after Army
proqram termination, is listed below:
TABLE 2
LAV-25 FY ACQUISITION PROFILE
82 83 84 85 Total
Initial 60 134 60 35 289
Final 60 170 123 69 422
The first production vehicle was delivered on 28
November 1983. This vehicle and the next 14 produced were
used for various operational and enqineerinq tests. The
first delivery of LAV-25s to a Marine Corps unit occurred
when three LAV-25s were delivered to Infantry Traininq
School (ITS) , Camp Pendleton, California. These three
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vehicles were used for training of vehicle crewmen. The
first delivery of LAV-25s to a combat unit occurred in May
1984 when LAV-25S were delivered to Company A, 1st LAV
Battalion, 29 Palms, California. The last LAV-25 was
completed in 1986 and delivered to the Marine Corps in May
1987. The LAV-25 is expected to have a 20-year life cycle.
The estimated total cost for the LAV program was $900
million.
D. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
On 5 June 1981, the Army and the Marine Corps entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement specifying the conditions for
establishing the joint LAV Program Manager's (PM) office.
As stated above, the PM was located at the Army's TACOM,
Warren, Michigan. With the establishment of the PM, the
focus of the acquisition effort shifted from the Marine
Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia,
to TACOM. The first LAV PM Charter was approved by both
Services in 1982. The Charter designated the PM as the
single individual responsible for [Ref. 6:p. 1]
:
Overall acquisition and execution of the program.
LAV life cycle management.
Selecting and structuring an Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) system to provide full ILS prior to
fielding.
Essentially, the PM represented the interests of the
Government to the contractor.
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With the establishment of the PM, a single individual
(but joint organization) was now responsible for all aspects
of joint LAV development. The LAV PM office remained a
joint office until early 1984 when the Army terminated their
involvement in the LAV program. Although the PM office
remained at TACOM, the Marine Corps became the sole user
responsible for the LAV program.
E. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT MEASURES
ILS is a composite of all considerations necessary to
assure the effective and economical support of a system for
its life cycle. ILS can be defined as [Ref. 7:p. 351]:
A disciplined, unified, and iterative approach to the
management and technical activities necessary to: (a)
integrate support considerations into system and equipment
design; (b) develop support requirements that are related
consistently to readiness objectives, to design, and to
each other; (c) acquire the required support; and (d)
provide the required support during the operational phase
at minimum cost.
To manage ILS considerations, three levels of ILS
planning and coordination existed in each of the support
organizations. At the first level were the branch heads who
established logistics policies and resolved problems that
could not be resolved at lower levels. At the second level
were logistics managers who carried out the policies and
direction provided by higher headquarters. At the third
level were the various functional, technical and
administrative support personnel. Planning and coordination
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between all three levels of all four branches occurred
continuously.
Because the Marine Corps was now the only Service
requiring the LAV-25, all LAV-25 logistics data developed
was converted to a Marine Corps format, in accordance with
MIL-STD-1388-1A and Marine Corps Order 4400.32, Policy For
Logistics Support of New Equipment Introduced into the
Marine Corps. Additionally, selected logistics functions
were transferred from Army organizations to Marine Corps and
other organizations. A transition plan was developed in
early 1985 to begin transferring ILS functions from TACOM
and the Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command
(AMCCOM) to Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps (HQMC) , Marine
Corps Logistics Base, Albany Georgia (MCLBA) , and the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . Significant transfers
included [Ref. 8]:
Transfer of the Primary Inventory Control Activity
(PICA) , responsibility for LAV-25 Marine Corps unique
items, from AMCCOM to MCLBA.
Transfer of PICA responsibility for items used on the
LAV-2 5, but common to other Department of Defense
(DOD) systems, to DLA.
Transfer of Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) data files
and management responsibility from TACOM and AMCCOM to
MCLBA.
Transfer of maintenance management responsibility from
TACOM and AMCCOM to MCLBA.
Transfer of responsibility for technical content of LAV
Technical Manuals (TMs) to HQMC.
15
Thus, although the PM was primarily responsible for Program
support, three other organizations had important support
responsibilities. These organizations were DLA, HQMC, and
MCLBA. DLA was responsible for providing supply support for
items for which DLA was designated as Integrated Material
Manager. HQMC established the Acquisition Project Office in
the Ground Weapons Branch to coordinate Marine Corps
acquisition activities and policy. MCLBA was responsible
for LAV-25 logistics support once the LAV-25 was placed in
service in Fleet Marine Force units.
The LAV-25 accelerated acquisition strategy naturally
required accelerated ILS planning. With a mere 18 months
between contract award and planned attainment of IOC, ILS
planners faced the monumental task of ensuring adequate
near-term and long-term support was provided for the LAV.
The potential for supportability problems was acknowledged
early in the program. The PM's Acquisition Plan states
[Ref. 9:p. 9]:
The combination of an accelerated LAV acquisition schedule
and compressed time frame for ILS planning increases the
risk in meeting important support functions which could
impact on operational requirements and on life cycle
costs. To minimize this risk, very specific and detailed
ILS planning has been integrated into the program early to
ensure that supportability is thoroughly and continuously
examined for both Services.
Thus the focus of the ILS approach was to minimize near term
support risks.
To appreciate the magnitude of the LAV-25 ILS challenge,
it is necessary to briefly revisit the vehicle's history.
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The LAV-2 5 is manufactured in North America by DDGM under a
licensing agreement from the Swiss firm MOWAG. The original
or base vehicle is a Swiss design by MOWAG called Piranha.
The LAV-25 was, in effect, re-created from the original
Swiss design so as to be acceptable for American or Canadian
armed forces. This process of "North Americanization"
created a new vehicle. This new vehicle, the LAV-25, was
not actually in production or in use by other armed forces.
Thus there was no developed or "experienced" ILS package
available to the Marine Corps. ILS required a developmen-
tal, "start from scratch" effort.
Despite the lack of a tested ILS package, the LAV
program had several characteristics which would help offset
the accelerated nature of the program and stabilize
planning. The LAV-25 represented current, not leading
technology. Design of the chassis, engine and hull were
stable. Design changes were anticipated in the turret.
These design changes, while anticipated, were not expected
to be disruptive to the ILS process. Additionally, the LAV-
25 had a great deal of commonality with other existing
systems in the Department of Defense (DOD) inventory.
Nevertheless, adhering to standard ILS procedures, as used
in a normal acquisition process would not allow for support
to be in place by the planned IOC date. This extraordinary
situation called for creative ILS measures. The
17
distinguishing characteristic of these innovative measures
was reliance on the contractor for support.
1. Supply Support
The most significant of these measures involved
supply support. The goal of the supply support process was
to ensure that adequate support equipment, repairables,
repair parts, and supply publications required to support
and maintain the LAV were available at the appropriate
levels of maintenance and supply during the initial period
of operational use, and that this support was continued and
improved through the review/replenishment supply support
procedures [Ref. 10:p. 11-24]. The near-term plan was to
develop three supply mechanisms to obtain spares concurrent
with production and initial fielding of the LAV-25. These
three initial fielding support mechanisms were the
Recommended Buy List (RBL) , the Basic Ordering Agreement
(BOA) and the 60-Day Mount Out List.
a. Recommended Buy List (RBL)
The RBL was a list of contractor recommended
repair parts and spares with quantities, at guaranteed
prices, to support the initial fielding of LAV-25s for a
twelve-month period [Ref. 10:p. 11-25]. The primary purpose
of the RBL was to serve as a mechanism to obtain Long Lead
Time Items (LLTI) . LLTI were defined as parts requiring
seven months or more production lead time. A significant
characteristic of the RBL was that it was compiled solely by
18
the Contractor without Government participation. The
Government had to accept the types and quantities of spares
listed in the RBL. Any change would constitute a
renegotiation and could delay delivery. The RBL was an
interim support device to be used while more detailed long
term provisioning was being accomplished. Any requirement
for parts not on the RBL could be filled by exercising the
BOA.
b. Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA)
The BOA was an agreement between the Government
and Detroit Diesel General Motors, through Canadian
Commercial Corporation, requiring DDGM to provide "spare and
repair parts, including any and all major assemblies,
subassemblies, special tools and special Test, Measurement
and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) for the variants of the
Light Armored Vehicle family...." [Ref. 10 :p. 11-26]
Conceptually, the BOA was designed to succeed the RBL as a
spares obtaining mechanism once the RBL expired. The
initial BOA was effective beginning on 3 February 1983. The
initial BOA was renewed yearly until it expired in 1987.
After expiration of the initial BOA, a new BOA was written
in 1987 and is currently being used. A distinguishing
feature of this BOA was that it indirectly served as a
mechanism for ensuring the availability of post production
support. As a requirement of the BOA, CCC agreed to provide
a pre-priced parts list for all LAV-25 parts on a quarterly
19
basis. Additionally, CCC agreed to attempt to develop
second sources for LAV-2 5 parts.
Unlike the RBL, BOA prices were negotiated at
the time of purchase. The BOA served, essentially, as a
contracting expedient. It was an agreement against which
orders could be placed. But the BOA was a sole source
procurement mechanism. As such, sole source justification
was required.
c. 60-Day Mount Out List
This list provided prices and quantities
sufficient to support 3 5 LAVs for 60 days in combat. The
range and depth of the list was determined by DDGM.
The long-term plan for follow-on provisioning
and repair parts support was to rely on the Government
supply system to provide sustained supply support. Spares
and repair parts would be provided by either DLA or MCLBA,
depending on which organization had the Integrated Material
Management responsibilities for the required parts.
2 . Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)
LSA is an inherent part of the systems engineering
process. LSA constitutes the integration and application of
various functions and techniques to ensure that
supportability requirements are considered in the systems
design process. LSA can effectively aid in evaluating a
design configuration relative to the determination of
specific logistics support requirements. LSA can also be
20
useful in evaluating the operating system in terms of its
supportability in the field environment. [Ref. 7: pp. 140-
141] .
As a requirement of Phase I competition, all four
competitors delivered a preliminary LAV-2 5 LSA. Consequent-
ly, the suitability of the full LSA was not a prime
consideration in making the production contract award.
After award of the production contract, DDGM conducted a
follow-on full-scale LSA in accordance with MIL-STD-1388-1A
and 2A. 3 The timing of the LSA was of critical importance.
Lacking the time to develop and validate the LSA prior to
production, the full LAV-2 5 LSA was conducted concurrent
with production of the vehicle. Thus, one of the major
benefits of conducting the LSA prior to entering into
production was not realized in the LAV-2 5 program. The
Government could not use the LSA to ensure that
supportability requirements were considered in the LAV-25
design process. The Government had to rely on the
contractor to ensure that was done. Although DDGM's LSA
capability was rated as "good" in the source selection
process, supportability as a result of design was not a
primary consideration.
The initial LSA review was conducted in May 1983 and
quarterly reviews were held thereafter. Lacking any field
3No LSA was conducted on the LAV-2 5 engine or the M242
chain gun because these systems already existed within DOD.
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usage data for the LAV-25, data were collected from
alternate sources. The data obtained from Phase I testing,
along with some data provided by the Canadian Armed Forces,
were used. Additionally, the LSA was conducted using M60A1
tank field usage data to supplement DDGM's existing LAV-25
data. The M60A1 tank data were used as a model in
evaluating personnel requirements and maintenance concepts
which were later verified through the full LSA process.
This combined LSA data base served as the basis for
determining the quantities and types of spares required to
support the LAV-25. A Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) was
conducted, in accordance with MIL-STD-1390, concurrent with
the development of the LSA data base and was used to
evaluate maintenance considerations derived from the LSA
data.
3 . Maintenance Concept
The LAV maintenance concept reflects the standard
Marine Corps maintenance organization, as required by Marine
Corps Order P4790.1, Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance
Management System. Required maintenance functions and tasks
were assigned to levels of maintenance, and echelons of
maintenance within maintenance levels, as a result of the
LSA and LORA. The LAI Battalion is capable of all
organizational level maintenance and limited intermediate
level maintenance on the LAV-25. Maintenance requirements
beyond the Battalion's capability are evacuated to the Force
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Service Support Group (FSSG) where more complete
intermediate maintenance capabilities exist. Depot level
maintenance is conducted at the Marine Corps depot repair





As an interim measure, LAV-2 5 commercial manuals
supplied by the contractor were fielded in lieu of validated
and Marine Corps approved Technical Manuals (TMs) . LSA data
were not available to develop the publications. However,
TMs would not have been available to support fielding of the
vehicle if the contractor waited for completion of the LSA.
Thus, as a concession to the fast track nature of the
program, TMs were developed concurrent with LSA development.
LAV-25 TMs were expected to be ready during October-December
1984. That proved to be an overly optimistic goal. Most
LAV-2 5 TMs were not ready at that time. Even when
published, the TMs contained numerous inaccuracies. The
estimated and actual availability dates for LAV-25 TMs are
listed in Appendix B.
5 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)
The LAV-25 reliability goal was 1950 Mean Miles
Between Mission Failures (MMBMF) . The minimum MMBMF was
1250 miles. A 90% Operational Availability was desired
based on an assumed Administrative and Logistics Delay Time
of 17 hours per mission failure. The LAV-25 Maintenance
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Ratio (MR) , defined as maintenance hour per operating hour
excluding crew checks and services, was 0.3 at the
organizational level and 0.08 at the intermediate level. No
more than 2 0% of the maintenance tasks were to be performed
at the intermediate level or higher [Ref. 9:p. 12]. The
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) goal was not to exceed 1.3 clock
hours.
No conclusive data yet exists on LAV-25 RAM.
Studies are in progress to evaluate the LAV-25 RAM
performance. During Initial Production Testing and
Evaluation, some LAV-25s underwent RAM testing and greatly
exceeded RAM requirements. The FMF general perception is
that the LAV-25 has performed well beyond RAM expectations.
6 . Buyback Plan
The Buyback Plan provided a measure of protection
for the Government against obsolescence occurring as a
result of configuration changes initiated by the contractor.
Under the provisions of the Buyback Plan, the Government
would be compensated for all spares, repair parts and
special tools rendered obsolete as a result of contractor
design changes. Buyback Plan provisions included the
following items.
The Government would be reimbursed for obsolete items
for which no replacement was necessary.
For items procured from the RBL which require
replacement, replacement items would be provided by the
contractor and obsolete field stock would be returned
to the contractor.
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For items not procured from the RBL, the Government
would procure required replacements by issuing a
contract for the required items. The original
contractor would then reimburse the Government for the
contract price of the replaced parts.
The Buyback Plan only applied if the design change
was initiated by the contractor. Given the expected design
changes of the LAV-2 5 turret, the Buyback Plan was prudent
protection for the Government. But Government initiated
design changes were not covered under the Buyback Plan.
Thus the Government must absorb the costs associated with
Government initiated design changes. Under the Product
Improvement Program, 21 Government-initiated planned
improvements for the LAV-25 were approved. Additionally,
numerous other design changes or modifications to the other
LAV variants are pending. The cost to the Government to
retrofit the LAV-2 5 fleet with these changes is undetermined
because of a lack of funding. But costs could run into the
tens of millions of dollars for Government initiated design
improvements
.
F. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT ISSUES
Given the accelerated nature of the LAV program, ILS
planners foresaw many problems and recognized that not all
of these expected problems could be fully resolved prior to
fielding the LAV-25. For many issues, the only possible
course of action was to allow sufficient time for
development of solutions. Examples of these acknowledged
and expected problems include: availability of accurate
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technical publications, lack of the proper types and
quantities of tools, lack of the proper types and quantities
of Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) ,
uncertainty as to proper doctrine regarding LAV employment,
lack of adequate facilities for LAV units at the various
Marine Corps bases, adequacy of equipment allowances,
availability of required training and wartime ammunition,
and serious manpower assignment issues. What is noteworthy
is that these and some other problems were expected.
Important unexpected ILS issues regarding supply support
and post production support also arose after the vehicle was
fielded. The most significant unanticipated supportability
issue involved repair parts availability. From a
statistical perspective, the availability of LAV-25 repair
parts seemed satisfactory after the LAV-25 was fielded. DLA
generally reported approximately 90% availability for DLA
managed LAV National Stock Numbers [Ref. 11]. And indeed,
the three supply mechanisms put into place to provide near
term support worked well for the automotive portion of the
LAV-25. However, almost immediately after introduction to
FMF units, the LAV-25 began experiencing excessively high
failure rates due to the non -availability of certain long
lead time turret electronic components. These components
were unique to the LAV-2 5. As such, these turret parts were
new to the supply system and, unlike the LAV automotive
parts which were already resident in the supply system
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because they were common to other systems, required
establishing a provisioning base without any field usage
data to support provisioning estimates.
The difficulty in providing an adequate level of turret
electronic component spares and repair parts was compounded
by other factors. The turret electronic component failure
rate exceeded the failure rate predicted by the LSA. The
proper test equipment to troubleshoot, isolate and identify
failed turret components was not available to supporting
maintenance activities. The LAV-25 had been fielded before
the proper turret test equipment could be procured and
fielded to supporting maintenance activities. Thus, for
most failed turret components, corrective maintenance could
not be accomplished at the appropriate level. In many
cases, failed components that should have been repaired at
the organizational level were evacuated from the user to the
Depot Maintenance Activity at MCLBA for repair. This turret
failure problem was common to all LAV units and threatened
to bring the LAV program to a halt.
The Post Production Support Plan (PPSP) is a procedure
for identifying post production logistics support
requirements and ensuring these requirements are planned for
and met. As per MIL-STD-13 88-1A, the purpose of the Post
Production Support Analysis is to:
...analyze life cycle support requirements of the new
system/equipment prior to closing of production lines to
assure that adequate logistics support resources will be
available during the system/equipment's remaining life.
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Contractually, there was no requirement for a PPSP in the
original LAV-2 5 production contract. This oversight was
addressed by contract modification P00131 in 1987. This
modification identified the extent of required contractor
post production support as a data list of LAV-2 5 turret and
chassis parts sorted by DDGM part number, National Stock
Number (NSN) , lead time and unit price. This list also
identified an estimated price to procure out-of-production
items. Additionally, the contractor was required to provide
the estimated dates when contractors and subcontractors
would be ending LAV-2 5 production support. Although this
list satisfied DDGM's post production contractual
obligation, from the Government's point of view the list was
of little value. Any post production support requirements
beyond the information provided on the list would have to be
developed by the Government without contractor support.
G. CORRECTIVE INITIATIVES
Shortly after receiving its LAV-25s in May 1984, Company
A, First LAV Battalion began experiencing difficulty
obtaining repair parts. This was the beginning of a repair
parts problem that would last the next four years. While
Company A's initial problems involved the automotive portion
of the vehicle, the more lasting and serious problems were
encountered, as stated above, with the turret electronic
components. As LAV units were activated and began using the
vehicle, turret component failures occurred. Lacking the
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proper TMDE and tools to isolate faults and conduct repairs
at the organizational and intermediate maintenance levels
and sufficient spares within the supply system, LAV units
experienced a decrease in LAV-2 5 combat readiness. This
problem was first recognized as an FMF-wide problem in
August 1985.
Once the scope and seriousness of the turret parts
problem was realized, ILS planners organized to address the
problem. One of the first steps taken was to organize an
LAV "Tiger Team." The Tiger Team consisted of ILS
representatives from HQMC, MCLBA, PM-LAV and DLA. The Tiger
Team's function was to concentrate, as a team, all their
efforts on resolving ILS problems. Possible solutions,
again, focused on near-term and long-term initiatives.
1 . Near-Term Initiatives
For near-term assistance, ILS planners turned to the
three support mechanisms created to support initial
fielding. The following options were considered:
Utilize the BOA as a mechanism to contract for
emergency replenishment of turret components.
Borrow needed turret parts from the LAV-2 5 production
line.
Allow the MCLBA Depot Maintenance Activity to make
repairs on failed components and accept the resulting
long repair times and lowered LAV-25 readiness.
Utilize LAV-25S in Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks for
turret spares.
Prohibit operational use of the LAV-25 fleet until
turret spares availability improved.
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As in the supply support provisioning effort, the near term
solutions relied heavily on contractor support. Option 1
was adopted as the cornerstone of the get-well effort.
Options 2 and 3 were used in an attempt to provide immediate
support to FMF units. Options 4 and 5 were considered but
not implemented.
The process of awarding the contract for the
emergency replenishment purchase took just over one year to
complete. In August 1985, promptly after identifying the
turret parts problem, a sole source procurement action
against the BOA for LAV emergency spares was initiated. It
took approximately ten months to prepare this contract. But
on 5 June 1986, HQMC rejected the sole source procurement
under the Business Clearance Procedure and the requirements
of the Competition in Contracting Act which require the
approval of the Competition Advocate of the Marine Corps for
all procurements greater than $1 million that are other than
competitive actions. A competitive RFP was then released 23
June 1986 to nine potential sources. However, no bids were
received from industry in response to the competitive RFP.
The only response received of any kind was from Delco
Syste.ns Operations requesting a 12 0-day RFP extension. With
no response to the RFP from industry, MCLBA contacted CCC
and, in effect, asked them to submit a proposal. CCC agreed
to respond. But their response contained higher prices and
longer lead times than anticipated. On 3 September 1986, as
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part of the near-term solution, and with really no other
options available, MCLBA used the BOA to contract for two
emergency spare parts procurement contracts for LAV-25 parts
to CCC and Delco Systems Operations 4 . The net result of the
concerted effort to ensure adequate competition was actually
no competition at all and the additional delay of one year
in obtaining the parts.
The emergency spares procurement contract with CCC
called for delivery of 24 line items within 30 days of
contract award. Since the Marine Corps did not
realistically expect full delivery within 30 days, the
delivery timeframe was not considered to be a strict
contract deliverable. The contract contained no provision
for penalties if the contractor failed to deliver within the
specified timeframe. Given the lack of industry interest in
the contract, the Marine Corps was hardly in a position to
insist or demand strict compliance with the delivery
timetable. Instead, the 30-day delivery provision served
two purposes. First, it underscored the emergency nature of
the procurement. Second, it served as a goal for the Marine
Corps to begin to expect relief. But the 30-day delivery
provision proved to be overly optimistic. By 29 July 1987,
almost 11 months after contract award, full delivery had
been made on only six of the 24 line items. Partial
4 Delco Systems Operations was the sub-contractor for
the LAV-2 5 turret.
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delivery had been made on six other line items. The
majority of the remaining items were planned for delivery
between August 1987 and January 1988. The situation was
similar with the Delco contract. Delco was to provide 18
line items on an "as soon as available" basis. Delivery
times for these items ranged between nine and 15 months.
Despite the Marine Corps' awareness of the
infeasibility of 30-day delivery, the Marine Corps did not
expect the extended slippage in delivery times associated
with both contracts. But there were no other options
realistically available. Thus, it took two and one-half
years, from problem identification in August 1985 to
delivery of contracted spares in early 1988, before the
near-term recovery strategy could be fully implemented.
2 . Long-Term Initiatives
While the Tiger Team wrestled with the problem of
providing near-term relief, the Marine Corps recognized, for
the first time, the potential for long-term supportability
problems. Although many serious near-term problems existed,
the inability to provide adequate supply support was the
most serious long-term problem facing the program. To
ensure long-term supportability, the following options were
implemented.
a. Competitive Reprocurement
Competitive reprocurement is also known as
second sourcing or multiple sourcing. Simply stated, as the
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Government has a requirement for an item, instead of
contracting with the original vendor, the Government simply
solicits alternative price offers from other vendors to
produce the item. This process requires at least two
vendors who can produce the item. This appears to be an
attractive option. Competitive reprocurement is simple in
concept and desirable because it promotes the DOD goal of
maximizing competition to minimize costs and it also helps
maintain the vital defense industrial base [Ref. 12 :p. 12].
But, in the case of the LAV-2 5, the Government was unable to
competitively reprocure critical turret parts. Much of the
technical data needed to manufacture the turret components
was proprietary in nature. Proprietary rights are defined
as those rights which an owner of property has by virtue of
his ownership [Ref. 13]. Technical data are closely guarded
in industry because disclosure of technical data could
jeopardize the contractor's competitive advantage.
The Government did not own the rights to the
proprietary turret technical data nor did it have access to
the data. Thus, the Government was unable to solicit other
vendors to manufacture the parts. The Government's
inability to second-source needed spares and repair parts is
the single most important issue underlying the ILS
difficulties experienced by the LAV-25 program. Because it
is central to long-term LAV-25 supportability , competitive
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reprocurement will be examined in closer detail in Chapter
III.
b. Sole Source Procurement
Continuing to purchase LAV repair parts sole
source from original contractors presented several problems.
The Government faced the problem of increased cost. Due to
the sole source nature of the procurement, the vendor has
the Government at a competitive disadvantage. Being the
sole vendor gives the seller an advantage when negotiating
price. Additionally, as sole source contractors re-tool
their production lines to other functions, the cost to the
Government of returning to the original contractor increases
as contractor set-up costs increase. Unless the Government
buys quantities sufficient to justify keeping a sole source
production line open, contractors will show less and less
interest in continuing to set-up and produce what will
become, in essence, less and less profitable specialty
lines. This is what happened to the LAV-2 5 turret
components. Despite their monopolistic advantage, Delco and
DDGM became less interested in supporting the small number
of spares ordered because production and manpower expenses
limited the profitability of these spares. Thus, as the
LAV-2 5 production drew to a close, the Marine Corps faced
the problem of diminishing spare parts production bases.
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c. Reverse Engineer Turret Parts
The objective of a reverse engineering program
is the development of a Technical Data Package (TDP) in
order to enable the Government to competitively reprocure
spare parts. Successful completion of reverse engineering
should allow for competitive reprocurement. However, once
the process is complete, there is no guarantee that industry-
will respond to solicitations to produce the reverse
engineered item. The reverse engineering process is time
consuming and expensive. LAV-25 turret parts considered for
reverse engineering had to meet the following criteria:
- The part has limited or reduced sources of supply due
to the nonavailablity of a TDP, an incomplete TDP or
has a TDP that contains limited data rights.
There is no knowledge or evidence of current patent
rights
.
There is no security classification assigned to the
part.
The part is available to be loaned out to a contractor
and such loan will not adversely affect not deplete
required supply quantities.
Loaning or viewing the part is not otherwise precluded
by law.
The part is not engineering critical or unstable.
Ten items on the LAV-25 turret were identified in May 1987
as reverse engineering candidates. However, due to a lack
of funding, reverse engineering has not been completed on
most of these candidates.
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H. SUMMARY
This chapter has identified two main reasons for the
Marine Corps' adoption of an accelerated acquisition
strategy for the LAV-25. The first reason was the immediate
need for improved strategic and tactical mobility for RDJTF
forces. The second reason was the Marine Corps' need to
provide increased firepower and mobility to compensate for
significant firepower reductions occurring during the
1970 's. The consolidation of the Concept Exploration,
Concept Demonstration and Full Scale Development Phases into
a single Phase was an important deviation from the normal
acquisition process required by the LAV-2 5 accelerated
acquisition strategy. This chapter has highlighted the
innovative ILS measures taken to support the accelerated
fielding of the LAV-2 5. Prominent among these measures were
the RBL, BOA, 60-Day Mount Out List for supply support, an
abbreviated LSA using data from several sources, and the use
of commercial TMs for near-term technical publications
support. Additionally, this chapter identified the
inability to provide sufficient spares and repair parts,
principally for the LAV-25 turret, as the primary long-term,
unanticipated ILS issue arising from the accelerated
fielding process. A significant and related issue is the
inadequacy of the LAV-25 PPSP. Lastly, this chapter
identified the near-term and long-term corrective measures
taken to resolve the turret support problem. The emergency
36
procurement contracts awarded to CCC and Delco Systems
Operations were the primary measures taken to provide near-
term relief to the LAV-25 turret spares problem. Long-term
relief was to be accomplished through a combination of sole
source and competitive reprocurement replenishment buys
along with reverse engineering of selected turret parts.
Appendix C contains a chronology of the significant
events in the LAV-25 program.
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III. THE IMPACT OF NDI ON ILS
A. INTRODUCTION
References to the LAV-25 as a non-developmental item
(NDI) are found in many documents related to LAV-25
acquisition and support. From personal experience, the
author is aware that the common perception among many
Marines in LAV units is that the LAV-25 is a NDI. This
perception carries with it the expectation that not only is
the vehicle readily available, but the required support is
readily available. But is the LAV-25 truly a NDI? This
chapter will closely examine the characterization of the
LAV-25 as a NDI. It will also examine the implications of
NDI on competitive reprocurement
.
B. THE LAV-2 5 AS NDI
NDI is a term that identifies material available from a
variety of sources with little of no development required by
the Government. The statutory definition of NDI is [Ref.
14] :
Items of supply available in the commercial
marketplace.
Items of supply previously developed and in use by the
U.S. military Services or Government agencies, state
or local governments of foreign governments with which
the U.S. has a mutual defense cooperation agreement.
Items of supply described above that require only minor
modification in order to meet the requirements of the
procuring agency.
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Items of supply currently being produced but not yet
available in the commercial marketplace.
The catalyst for increased use of NDI within DOD was the
June 1986 Packard Commission Report. The President's Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also known as the
Packard Commission, strongly advocated the use of off-the-
shelf commercial products rather than items custom made to
military specifications.
The advantages of NDI include reduced research and
development costs, decreased procurement lead time resulting
in more rapid delivery and fielding and use of current
technology available in the marketplace. The disadvantages
of the NDI approach include the possibility that the NDI
might not meet all the essential performance requirements
thereby requiring a tailoring of the requirements to fit the
technology. Additionally, the modifications required for
off-the-shelf items may become major modifications and
undermine the intended NDI benefits. Significant
maintenance problems can occur because of NDI and commercial
product proliferation. [Ref. 15:pp. 10-11] A study by the
Logistics Systems Analysis Office concluded that [Ref. 16:p.
20] :
...systems acquired without sufficient technical data and
systems with unique/uncommon support items which are not
similar in performance to existing inventory items will
cause item proliferation.
Another disadvantage involves logistics support.
Accelerating the ILS processes may result in omitting or not
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covering in sufficient detail the ILS tasks required. For
military designed systems [Ref. 16:p. 5]:
...initial provisioning for logistics support takes place
during the production phase. The production phase is
normally lengthy enough to accommodate the requirements
for provisioning conferences, reviewing technical data and
obtaining NSN's. An NDI system is already in production,
and, therefore, ready (or close to ready) for deployment
....performing initial provisioning for an NDI system
within the same time constraints as a non-NDI system can
delay deployment.
NDI can be categorized as "off-the-shelf" or as
"modified off-the-shelf." Off-the-shelf means just that.
The item can be used "as is" without any modification.
Modified off-the-shelf items require some modification
before operational use. The LAV-25 is considered a modified
off-the-shelf NDI. The 25 June 1982 Acquisition Plan stated
[Ref. 9]:
The program involves the acquisition of essentially non-
developmental combat vehicles modified to meet specific
requirements with the expressed purpose of improving the
operational capability of both the United States Marine
Corps and the United States Army.
Additionally, the initial LAV Integrated Logistics Support
Plan (ILSP) stated, "The LAV has been designated as a non-
developmental system because a significant number of its
components are already marketable items." [Ref. 17: p. II-
20]
The LAV-25 meets the statutory standards for
classification as a NDI acquisition. But despite the desire
stated in the RFP for an off-the-shelf vehicle, no vehicle
actually in production was selected for testing purposes
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[Ref. 3:p. 189]. While the acquisition of the LAV-25 can be
classified as NDI, from an ILS perspective, the LAV-25 was
not NDI. The time required to produce the vehicle and
achieve IOC was greatly exceeded by the time required to
establish full ILS. The production time for the 422 LAV-25s
extended from November 1983 to May 1987. Although there
can be no clear boundary marking full ILS attainment, ILS
clearly was not fully effective when LAV-25 production was
completed, as evidenced by the emergency turret buys.
Although the LAV-25 was characterized as NDI, the
vehicle can be considered partly a NDI and partly a
developmental item. This distinction can be drawn between
the automotive hull and the turret. As stated in Chapter
II, the design of the automotive hull was stable and repair
parts were generally available. Design changes were
expected in the turret. These design changes, combined with
the difficulty in obtaining turret spare parts/repairables
and the number of product improvements to the turret,
clearly shows that the turret was developmental.
The extent of modifications required to an off-the-shelf
item can call into question the classification of the item
as NDI. As stated in Chapter II, the LAV-25 program was
required by the MENS to contain a Product Improvement Plan
(PIP) . Product improvements are modifications to the
vehicle to improve performance. The LAV-25 has had 21
approved turret product improvements. Numerous others for
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both the turret and the automotive hull have been suggested
but not yet approved.
The extent of NDI product improvements also suggests
another pitfall of a modified NDI: the potential for the
PIP program to serve as a substitute for design and
performance improvements/changes that, in a developmental
program, would be discovered and incorporated into design
prior to production.
Careful screening of NDI candidates during the market
survey is essential to ensure that a suitable NDI candidate
is available in the marketplace. Since the purpose of the
LAV-2 5 market survey was to identify potential candidates
that could meet the operational requirements specified in
the ROC, the screening was successfully accomplished in the
LAV-2 5 program. From personal experience, the author is
aware that the LAV-25 has been an operational success.
But choosing a NDI that requires excessive modification
can cripple a program. The U.S. Army's experience with the
Roland missile is illustrative of a NDI modified to the
point of failure. Roland, the predecessor of the Sergeant
York Division Air Defense System, was to be a large-scale
NDI. However, the Army modified tne missile right out of
existence [Ref. 18:p. 9].
The success of the LAV-25 and the failure of the Roland
serve to illustrate that NDI can be modified to meet some
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requirements, but that in other situations a developmental
approach is needed.
C. COMPETITIVE REPROCUREMENT
Spare parts procurement can be divided into two
activities: initial spares procurement and spares
replenishment. Initial spares are bought during the
provisioning process. Provisioning is the process of
selecting not only spare parts but a wide range of support
functions needed to support the system when deployed.
Initial spares are the spares needed to support initial
fielding. Initial spares procurement normally occurs during
the production phase and decreases as production draws to a
close. Replenishment parts are those parts purchased after
the parts are available in the supply system and a demand
history or pattern has been established. Replenishment is
the process of restocking the inventory as a result of parts
being used by the operating and supporting activities.
Replenishment spares procurement is limited during
production and increases as the weapons system moves through
its life cycle. It is during the process of replenishment
that competitive reprocurement of spares becomes
significant. [Ref. 19:pp. 151-153,158]
The Government can conduct replenishment buys in one of
two ways: sole source or competitive reprocurement.
Competition is the preferred method. But competition is not
always possible. As stated in Chapter II, competition for
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the LAV-25 emergency spares procurement contract was desired
but not forthcoming. Competition could not be introduced
because potential vendors could not possibly compete without
access to the proprietary data needed to produce the items.
Central to the issue of multiple sourcing is the issue of
data rights.
The Government has extensive need for many kinds of
technical data. It is DOD policy to acquire only such data
as is essential to meeting Government needs. Technical data
rights can be classified as unlimited and limited, as
defined below [Ref. 20:p. 5-18]:
Unlimited rights establish the right to use, duplicate
or disclose technical data in whole or in part in any
manner and for any purpose whatsoever, and to direct or
permit others to do so.
Limited rights establish the right of the Government,
or others on behalf of the Government, to use
duplicate, or disclose data, but not outside the
Government without written permission.
Unlimited rights are acquired automatically if the data are
developed at Government expense and are identified as a
contract deliverable. Limited rights serve to protect
technical data developed at private expense. Because the
Government did not fund the development of the LAV-25, the
Government had only limited rights to LAV-25 technical data.
Thus, much of the technical data concerning the LAV-2 5
turret parts were proprietary in nature and could not be
used by the Government for competitive reprocurement
purposes.
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For competitive reprocurement of spares, four principal
methods exist to conduct the technology transfer necessary
to create a second source. They are Technical Data Package
(TDP) , Reverse Engineering, Directed Licensing, and
Breakout.
1. Technical Data Package (TDP)
The TDP presents a detailed description of the item
being procured. The TDP is a complete set of plans,
engineering drawings, associated lists, specifications,
standards, models, performance reguirements
,
guality
assurance provisions and packaging data and may range from a
single line item to thousands of pages of documentation
[Ref. 21:p. 34]. The engineering drawings are available in
three levels. Level 1 drawings provide detail sufficient to
evaluate preliminary design. Level 2 drawings support
manufacture of production prototypes. Level 3 drawings
provide engineering detail sufficient to make a reproduction
of the item. It is the Level 3 drawings that are needed in
order to allow the Government to compete a replenishment
spares procurement contract.
The critical issue regarding the TDP is access to
the data contained in the Level 3 drawings. The Government
can obtain access to the data in one of two ways: the
Government can buy the data rights in their entirety or it
can negotiate compensation for access to only that portion
of the data needed for competitive reprocurement. An
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accurate and complete TDP should allow for competitive
reprocurement of spares, manufacture of identical items and
provide an equipment baseline. But obtaining the TDP does
not, in and of itself, assure that second sourcing will be
successful
.
The Government has the responsibility to validate,
maintain and update the TDP to ensure correctness. This
formidable task may delay the second sourcing effort if the
Government underestimates the workload required in assuming
TDP management responsibilities. Additionally, the TDP
contains "know-how" which is an intangible difficult to put
down on paper and is the factor most troublesome in
implementing the technology transfer [Ref. 22 :p. 42],
2 . Reverse Engineering
The reverse engineering process was briefly
described in Chapter II. Essentially, reverse engineering
is the process of disassembling an item to its smallest
components to discover the processes that make the item
function in order to create a duplicate item that performs
the same function. The result of reverse engineering allows
the consideration of multiple sources of supply. As stated
in Chapter II, reverse engineering can be a very time
consuming, difficult and expensive process. It may not be
suitable as a primary competitive reprocurement method.
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3 . Directed Licensing
In the directed licensing method, the system
developer, in exchange for a royalty fee, grants permission
or license to another firm to produce an end item of
proprietary interest to the developer. The licensing
approach should be used only when the system developer
refuses to grant the Government unlimited data rights, as
was the case with LAV-25. The system developer, under the
licensing concept, grants only limited data rights to the
second source. The system developer maintains proprietary
interest in the data and retains design responsibility.
Licensing provides for the transfer not only of technical
data but of the intangible "know how" not provided by the
TDP. The license approach reduces the administrative burden
of the Government because the technology transfer is
accomplished between vendors. However, the use of royalty
fees may increase the cost of the spares. Additionally,
there may be a problem of licensor motivation. The licensor
may be uncooperative and reluctant to assist the licensee.
Because the licensor retains proprietary control over item
design, technology transfer may be slower than desired and
result in longer lead times for competitively reprocured




Breakout is a program which identifies high value or
high demand items for which competition is desired during
replenishment. The primary purpose of breakout is to reduce
the cost of repair parts by breaking the part out; that is,
purchasing the part from other than the prime contractor.
In the breakout process, parts are comprehensively examined
to determine whether or not a part can be competed. The
breakout process is subject to the same restrictions on
technical data availability as all other competitive
reprocurement processes. Competitive reprocurement of parts
that fail breakout selection due to technical data
restrictions must be achieved by another method, such as
reverse engineering or directed licensing.
None of the above listed second sourcing methods was
originally adopted in the LAV program. The TDP was not
purchased because of the NDI nature of the program [Ref.
9:p. 16]. However, very early in the program, consideration
and acknowledgment were given to the potential need for
establishing a second source program. One section of a
draft LAV acquisition plan, dated 3 August 1981, stated:
Competitive data, including proprietary rights and patent
data . This is a competitive acquisition which will have a
price option for an assignable license to create a second
source. It is planned to have a predetermination of
proprietary rights in the production RFP.
However, no such predetermination was made. The LAV-25
production contract was awarded without any stipulations
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that would permit competitive reprocurement of spares based
on the manufacturer's technical data.
When the Government desires to introduce competitive
pressure by establishing multiple sources without the
benefit of unlimited data rights, technology transfer from
one vendor to another is required. This technology transfer
cannot be accomplished without the willful cooperation of
the owner of the data rights. Only after the LAV-2 5 turret
parts problem received the continued and persistent high-
visibility attention of the Commanding General, MCLBA, did
the contractor reluctantly agree to consider a second source
method for turret parts.
On 2 3 June 1987, a supplemental agreement to the
LAV-25 production contract was approved stating the
following:
The Contractor will grant to the Government limited
license rights in data for the LAV-25 turret spare/repair
parts that are currently coded in the LSA as PA-SMR. . . .The
Contractor shall not be obligated to provide to the
Government limited license rights in technical data for
lower-tier vendor proprietary items.... The Government will
be allowed to provide the limited license rights technical
data granted in accordance with this contract section to
third parties who have prior executed data exchange
agreements with the Contractor for the sole purpose of
bidding and performing on spare/repair parts contracts
with the Government. . .
.
This was a step in the right direction but it was not a
panacea. There were still proprietary restrictions on data
belonging to lower-tier vendors. The problem of timeliness
also still existed. Developing multiple sources and
providing tested, fully functional parts to the FMF would be
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a time-consuming process. However, if multiple sources had
been licensed and developed after the vehicle baseline had
been established and prior to fielding the vehicle the
supply system response time for second source LAV-25 parts
might have been quicker.
D. ANALYSIS
The LAV-25 acquisition is representative of a
fundamental problem associated with complex NDI: the
seemingly unresolveable conflict between the Government's
need for data so as to promote competition in reprocurements
and the Government's responsibility to respect and protect
the rights of private corporations/individuals who have
developed data at their own expense. Private industry
naturally feels that the Government does not adequately
safeguard their rights. In a survey of 35 member companies
by the Proprietary Industries Association, the 35 companies
unanimously said that DOD policy on technical data
discourages vendors' development/use of new technology in
products sold to the Government and discourages industry
participation in Government procurement [Ref. 15:p. 32].
Over the years, the Government policies have served, at
one time or another, to restrict or to protect the rights of
privately developed technical data. As an example of
Government action taken to restrict privately developed
technical data rights, the Secretary of the Air Force in
September 1983 directed the use of a contract clause
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limiting a manufacturer's rights in proprietary data to five
years or less from the date of manufacture of the first
production unit of a weapon system [Ref. 24:p. v] .
Recently, however, the Government has taken action to
protect privately developed technical data rights. Public
Law 100-456 of September 1988 limits the Government's
authority to require prospective developers or producers of
major systems to provide proposals which would enable the
Government to use technical data to obtain future
competition when acquiring items or components of the weapon
system, where the items or components were developed
exclusively at private expense [Ref. 25:p. 16]. But
regardless of technical data rights policies, the Government
always has the ability to negotiate the data rights
accessibility for competitive reprocurement purposes prior
to awarding the production contract if it chooses to do so.
In a developmental acquisition, the time to ensure that
the Government ' s data rights interests are protected is
during the design competition when competitive pressure
assists the Government in negotiating data rights.
Contractors are more willing to resolve proprietary data
issues in a competitive environment rather than a non-
competitive environment. In the LAV-2 5 NDI acquisition, the
opportune time to ensure the Government's data rights
interests were protected was during the Phase I competition
prior to award of the LAV-25 production contract. It was
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during that time that the Government had the advantage of
competition to provide incentive for the LAV-2 5 production
candidates to negotiate for future second sourcing. By not
considering future second sourcing, the LAV-25 was locked
into a sole source replenishment method for parts containing
proprietary data. The restrictions imposed by Public Law
100-456 make it all the more imperative that the Government
negotiate a mutually acceptable data rights agreement prior
to contract award, while the Government still has
negotiating leverage.
Numerous examples exist of systems acquisitions, both
developmental and non-developmental, where failure to
adequately consider the potential for future competition of
replenishment spares has resulted in higher prices and
lengthy delays in providing parts for the field. A
recommendation that emerged from the NDI Beretta Pistol
acquisition called for competing spare parts, if possible,
with the end item [Ref 26] . The Sergeant York5 program,
nominally a NDI program, experienced difficulties in
competitive breakout and recommended pursuing strategies for
procuring replenishment spares and resolving proprietary
data claims early in the program [Ref. 27:pp. 1-04,05].
5The Sergeant York program has been cancelled and is
considered to be a prime example of all that is wrong with
the acquisition process. Nevertheless, the ILS lessons
learned are creditable and germane .
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Herein lies an essential dilemma associated with major
NDI as evidenced by the LAV-25 program: the NDI concept
relates to acquisition considerations alone. The NDI
concept does not give sufficient consideration to the impact
of ILS on the classification of a program as NDI. The NDI
definition may be suitable for simple, everyday items such
as cots, flashlights and light bulbs. But for larger, more
complex systems requiring ILS, the current NDI concept is
insufficient and requires expansion. It is important to
recognize that in some military acquisitions the ILS package
provided by the contractor will be satisfactory because the
item will be used in an environment identical or similar to
the commercial environment. But, for some acquisitions, the
range of ILS required may exceed that provided by the
contractor because the unique military application and
environment exceeds the normal commercial use.
The Army has expanded the basic definition of NDI to
include categories of development required [Ref. 16:p. 4]:
Category A: Off-the-shelf items to be used in the same
environment for which the items were designed with
little or no development required.
Category B: Off-the-shelf items to be used in an
environment different than that for which the items
were designed with some development required.
Category C: Integration of existing componentry and
the essential engineering effort to accomplish systems
integration with research and development to integrate
systems.
This expanded definition obviously does not give sufficient
consideration to the impact of ILS. The author proposes
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that DOD adopt, as listed below, a modified version of the
Army's categorization of NDI to more accurately describe the
ILS requirements of NDI systems.
Category A: Off-the-shelf items to be used in the same
environment for which the items were designed with
little or no development required. These items require
no logistics support beyond that already provided.
Category B: Off-the-shelf items to be used in an
environment different than that for which the items
were designed with some development required. These
items require an additional level of logistics support
that can be provided or developed in a timeframe
sufficient to support the full range of anticipated
use.
Category C: Off-the-shelf items requiring extensive
additional logistics support beyond that which can be
provided during the initial fielding and operational
deployment of the system. Tailoring of these
additional ILS processes may be necessary to support
initial fielding. An expanded PPSP is required to
ensure life cycle support.
A number of ILS risks were identified early in the LAV
program. In the LAV Risk Management Plan, the problems of
compressed ILS planning time and an accelerated acquisition
schedule were acknowledged:
Concurrency and compression of ILS planning is cause for
concern. .. .Given the accelerated acquisition schedule, an
ILS schedule which is not only compressed but is not
completed until the initiation of the LAV production phase
increases the risk that: (1) ILS requirements and data
inputs into the Testing and Evaluation Program will be
insufficient; (2) Supportability deficiencies will not
have been sufficiently identified before production; (3)
Greater reliance, hence dependence on the contractor will
increase the probability of shortfalls in Marine Corps ILS
preparations for the development of the LAV.... In contrast
to full-scale material development, off-the-shelf
acquisitions give a user very little opportunity to
influence the support characteristics of a system.
Further, an off-the-shelf acquisition program increases
the need for an ILS posture, for entry into the deployment
and operation phases, wherein support elements are already
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in position and in operation and have the flexibility to
absorb off-the-shelf system peculiarities.
The ILS concerns stated above accurately reflect many of the
problems that came to pass in the LAV-2 5 program. By 3
June 1987, the LAI Battalions were not yet capable of
executing their full range of missions. Personnel issues,
such as the lack of scout infantrymen contributed strongly
to this condition. The Naval Audit Service reported that
the following additional factors contributed to degraded
equipment readiness [Ref. 28:p. 7]:
The ordering of repair parts was delayed because
adequate and timely data on technical drawings and
secondary sources of supply were not available.
The LAV Battalions were provided draft copies of LAV
maintenance manuals and parts lists when the vehicles
were delivered. However, the drafts did not contain
up-to-date configuration data, and up-to-date manuals
and parts lists were not published because the
contractor had not yet identified and incorporated all
engineering changes in the drafts.
The LAV was basically an off-the-shelf item procured in
an accelerated manner. In selecting this acquisition
method, the Marine Corps was aware that equipment
support would suffer for a few years.
LAV-25 acquisition planning definitely was aggressive and
proactive. But regarding long-term supportability, ILS
planning was reactive.
The LAV-2 5 contract was a production contract. As such,
the LAV-25 principal manufacturers, DDGM and Delco, were
focused on the terms of their contract: produce 422 LAV-
25s. The contractors were not focused on post production
support and long-term sustainability issues. But this is
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not an inherent fault or weakness of the LAV-2 5 producers.
The contractors provided the products and services required
by the Government. The Government did not focus on post
production support and long-term supportability. The
Government was oriented to producing the vehicle in a
timeframe sufficient to achieve IOC [Ref. 29]:
The LAV Program will feature an accelerated acquisition
approach designed to achieve IOC in the minimum possible
time and at an affordable cost. Success is based on
procuring hardware to a maximum degree compatible with the
effectiveness desired for the run-off 6 . Elements such as
logistics support, publications and training will be
emphasized in the production phase where costs for the
elements will be associated with only one contractor.
This passage reveals the primary importance of cost,
schedule and performance as a consideration in the source
selection process. It also reveals the secondary importance
of ILS as a consideration in source selection process.
Rather that incur the higher costs associated with having
each competitor develop and present their full ILS
capabilities as an evaluation area in source selection, ILS
development was delayed until after award of the production
contract. Costs of ILS development would then be incurred
by only one contractor. Thus from the beginning of the
program, ILS concerns were secondary in importance.
The LAV-2 5 accelerated acquisition understandably
produced an up-front/near-term focus. But in a major NDI
,
just the opposite is needed. With so little time to prepare
6Run-off refers to the competition between the four
candidates for the production contract.
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support to last the lifetime of the vehicle, the attention
paid in the near-term to the long-term post production
support becomes critical. The Government must have
contractual safeguards built into a NDI production contract
to ensure long-term supportability
.
E. SUMMARY
From personal experience the author is aware that the
lack of a TDP is the reason most often cited by FMF Marines
as to why the turret parts problem existed. This attitude
can be summarized as "The parts problem is bad because the
Marine Corps did not buy the TDP." This is a popular, and
attractive idea, but it is too simplistic. Having a TDP is
not a guarantee of competitive reprocurement success. As
outlined above, possessing a TDP is replete with
opportunities for problems that could delay, and even
prevent, competitive reprocurement success. For the
accelerated acquisition of the LAV-25, the challenge was to
accurately forecast demand, without usage data, in order to
obtain sufficient spares concurrent with production.
Generally, this procedure was successful. The LAV-25
contains 7975 items, 2065 of which are turret items and 5910
are automotive/hull items [Ref . 30] . The emergency spares
procurement contract was to DDGM for 24 items and to Delco
for 18 items in varying quantities. Yet significant
difficulties were experienced in procuring these
replenishment items. A more accurate assessment of why the
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Marine Corps had a turret parts problem is that the Marine
Corps did not give sufficient consideration to competitive
reprocurement and long-term supportability considerations
prior to award of the LAV-25 production contract.
To some extent, the LAV-2 5 program was a pioneer in NDI
acquisition. The Packard Commission Report, calling for
greater use of NDI, was issued four years after the NDI
procurement of the LAV-2 5. Strong arguments can be made
both for and against classifying the LAV-25 as a NDI. The
author believes that the LAV-2 5 was not truly a NDI. The
LAV-25 stands as an example of the extremely subtle and fine
distinction between modified NDI and NDI that evolves into a
developmental item.
58
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this thesis was on the major ILS lessons to
be learned from the LAV-2 5 program. The author believes the
following conclusions and recommendations represent the
major lessons learned from the LAV-2 5 program.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The current concept of NDI does not give sufficient
emphasis to the impact ILS has on the NDI nature of the
program . ILS considerations can fundamentally alter the NDI
nature of a large program if they differ from those in
place. Off-the-shelf may adeguately describe the
availability of the hardware but it does not describe the
capability of the system to fight and be sustained in
combat.
Planning for competitive reprocurement for a large and
complex system procured in an accelerated acquisition, such
as the LAV-2 5, must be accomplished before the production
contract is awarded . NDI has its applications but it is not
a panacea for acquisition problems. NDI essentially locks a
program into a sole source, unless steps are taken to early
on to ensure future competition. The problem of data rights
access exists in developmental as well as NDI acquisitions.
But because of the compressed timeframe associated with NDI
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ILS, the problem can be more acute with NDI . A balance must
be struck between the requirement to ensure long term
supportability and the need for vendors to protect their
data rights. The earlier in the acquisition a competitive
reprocurement methodology is considered and planned for, the
more effective it will be when production is completed.
In an accelerated acquisition, ILS flexibility is a
prerequisite to loner-term supportability, which must be
built into the source selection process. The best way to
ensure flexibility is inclusion of a comprehensive PPSP . In
an accelerated acquisition where there is insufficient time
available to fully develop ILS, flexibility is a must. A
"cradle to grave" approach is imperative. The PPSP is the
key to ensuring the flexibility necessary to provide "cradle
to grave support" will be available. Without a PPSP, the
Government has very few options available for long-term
support. In the LAV-25 program, the absence of an adequate
PPSP meant that the BOA was the only mechanism available to
ensure the LAV-25 production base was maintained. The BOA
was the only device that tied the contractor to the vehicle
as a source of support. More flexibility must be built into
large, complex NDI to allow for future growth and support.
Some ILS considerations simply cannot be accelerated .
There is no substitute for the time required to produce
quality TMs, TMDE, tools and facilities. Operational
planners must recognize this and be aware of the risks of
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limited ILS when establishing IOC and deployment plans for
items procured in an accelerated acquisition.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
A full LSA should be a requirement of the source
selection process so that LSA can be completely evaluated
prior to production contact award . The Government
relinquishes its ability to ensure supportability
requirements are incorporated into design when the
Government does not have the LSA prior to production
contract award.
ILS must receive equal consideration with other
requirements . DODI 5000.1 requires that:
Logistics supportability requirements ... shall be
established early in the acquisition process and be
considered in the formulation of the acquisition strategy.
They shall receive emphasis comparable to that accorded to
cost, schedule and performance objectives and
requirements
.
In the LAV-2 5 program, this was not the case. The common
attitude expressed in the FMF was that the vehicle was
intentionally fielded as quickly as possible and ILS would
have to "catch up." Such an approach is not necessary if
ILS is evaluated equally with cost, schedule and performance
considerations.
It is easy to understand how cost, schedule and
performance considerations could dominate a program
constrained by time and driven to achieve IOC. But if the
NDI requires a level of ILS different than or beyond that
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which can be provided by the manufacturer, the success of a
program can be jeopardized if the system is operationally
deployed in response to a crisis without the full range of
support available.
For NDI systems. supply support should be a major
evaluation area in the source selection process . The issue
is whether the manufacturer's spares and repair parts
concept satisfies the user's needs. To determine this,
competitors for production contracts should be evaluated on
their ability to provide spares and repair parts as a
separate area in the source selection process. Competitors
can be evaluated as to technical data, breakout, first and
second sourcing plans for repair parts, and post production
support. In NDI acquisitions such as the LAV-2 5, where
contractor claims of limited data rights are virtually
guaranteed, evaluation of supply support is all the more
important when the nature of the contract locks the
Government into a sole source environment.
The concept of NDI currently in use by POD should be
expanded, as follows, to allow for the significance of ILS ;
Category A: Off-the-shelf items to be used in the same
environment for which the items were designed with
little or no development required. These items require
no logistics support beyond that already provided.
Category B: Off-the-shelf items to be used in an
environment different than that for which the items
were designed with some development required. These
items require an additional level of logistics support
that can be provided or developed in a timeframe
sufficient to support the full range of anticipated
use.
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Category C: Off-the-shelf items requiring extensive
additional logistics support beyond that which can be
provided during the initial fielding and operational
deployment of the system. Tailoring of these
additional ILS processes may be necessary to support
initial fielding. An expanded PPSP is required to
ensure life cycle support.
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APPENDIX A
MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENT (MENS) FOR THE LIGHT
ARMORED VEHICLE (LAV)
This appendix contains the MENS for the LAV program.
The MENS defines both the operational requirement for LAVs
and the requirement for accelerated acquisition of an "off-
the-shelf" system.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASH'S CrON. D C 20301
8 MAY 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SUBJECT: Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) for the Light
Armored Vehicle (LAV)
The USMC Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) for the Light
Armored Vehicle is approved. To expedite this urgently
required program, extraordinary means will be taken to tailor
the acquisition process to meet the planned IOC of 1983 which
I consider the first priority. At present, the LAV is to be
treated as a non-majcr system except that a fully-structured
Test and Evaluation- Master Plan, "keyed to the system acquisi-
tion plan, must be presented promptly to the Director Defense
Test and Evaluation for review and approval. YJhen Army
requirements are defined and the total magnitude of the pro-
gran: warrants it, we may change the designation to "major"
at that lime.
The Army has indicated a need for a similar vehicle but
currently lacks funding. Moreover, the Army MENS has not been
submitted for final approval. Notwithstanding these facts,
the need for both Services to acquire light armored vehicles
is recognized. Because of the similarity of needs, only one
program to acquire a near-term light armored vehicle program
will be supported; it must meet the needs of both Services.
In view of the above, the Army's experience in acquiring armored
vehicles, the history of cooperation which has marked earlier
programs in which the Army acquired equipment for the USMC, the
Army is designated as the contracting agency with overall
acquisition responsibility for the USMC LAV program. The Army
will support fully the USMC requirements. The USMC planned IOC
of 1983 must be met and the Army acquisition process must be
flexible enough to permit this. Since the LAV will be used by
two Services, the Army, in carrying out acquisition responsi-
bilities, must Insure USMC representation. At a minimum, the
Program Manager will be a Marine officer and the Source
Selection Evaluation Board will be chaired by the USMC. The „
acquisition strategy should incorporate planning and funding
for Preplanned Product Improvements to substantially reduce
manpower and logistic support requirements.
One area where we have been rightly criticized is a failure to.
provide suitable NBC capability. The Army and USMC must
seriously consider this threat. If feasible a capability to
operate effectively in an K5C environment should be Incorpo-
rated in the vehicles first fielded. If this capability is
not achievable when the first vehicles are fielded, the
acquisition approach should include the provision of this
capability as a planned product improvement. Additionally,
the Army should participate in and support the test and
evaluation of the various contractor vehicles. Independent
user evaluations should be provided by the Army and the Marines
to the Source Selection Advisory Council and production
decision recommending bodies in sufficient time to influence
their final recommendations.
I expect the Army and USMC to acquire essentially the same
vehicle. The needs are basically similar and meeting them is
long overdue. Every effort will be made by both Services to
expedite delivery of this urgently required system. I have
directed that the USDR&E intensively monitor this program to
insure that critial milestones are accomplished and the ICC
of 1983 is met.
</) / /.' •
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MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENT (MENS)
FOR THE LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE (LAV)
A. MISSION .
1. Mission Areas . The mission areas of Land Warfare (210) and Amphibious
Warfare (235) encompass the efforts required for limited intervention as well as for
major conflict. The Marine Corps' Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), as a potential
element to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), will be employed in either or both of
these mission areas.
2. Mission Element Need .
a. As an amphibious force and as part of the RDF, the Marine Corps has
unique capabilities which allow it to be responsive to the force projection aspects of
national strategy. When the force is projected ashore and carries out subsequent
operations in the Land Warfare (210) and Close Combat (211) mission areas, there exists
an acute need for light weapons, combat mobility, firepower, air defense, and antiarmor
capabilities.
b. Landing forces currently have limited mobility and direct gunfire
support to engage and destroy enemy forces rapidly in both the amphibious assault and
in subsequent operations ashore. To overcome these deficiencies, immediate require-
ments exist for a system having the following characteristics:
(1) Transportability .
(a) Strategic . A system is required which is capable of being
lifted in required numbers by current strategic airlift assets.
(b) Tactical . In order to allow for its projection ashore with
the helicopterborne assault elements, the system must be transportable by the CH-53E
helicopter.
(2) Mobility .
(a) Rapid cross-country mobility and agility without degra-
dation of on-road capability.
(b) Inherent mobility consistent with the cargo, weapons, or
other systems carried (i.e., command and control, air defense, etc.) and the expected
mobility of the threat.
(c) Swim capability.
(3) Protection .
(a) The survivability of the LAV and crew/passengers requires,
as a minimum, protection against 7.62 mm ball ammo and 50 ft air burst of 152 mm
artillery fire.
(b) NBC attack detection and protection.
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(4) Firepower . Variants of the LAV will possess differing
characteristics and will be capable of mounting a variety of weapons and equipment, to
include:
(a) A light assault variant mounting a gun capable of
delivering effective suppressive fires while providing protection for embarked combat
troops.
(b) An assault gun variant capable of engaging and destroying
armored vehicles, materiel and personnel targets at ranges of at least 2000 meters, and
providing effective suppressive fires against personnel targets with a secondary weapon
system.
(5) Variants which provide capabilities in other mission elements
will be investigated and may become candidates for procurement. These mission
elements include, but are not limited to, Ground Air Defense (213), Mine Warfare (214),
Land Combat Support and Combat Service Support (215 <5c 216), Fire Support (212),
Tactical Command and Control (254) and Electronic Warfare and Counter - C I (257).
B. THREAT OR BASIS FOR NEED .
1. This threat assessment addresses those portions of the Amphibious
Operating Area (AOA) from the line of departure for landing craft, inland to a depth of
45-50 kilometers and subsequent combat operations ashore up to a distance of 500 km.
Projections are for the period Initial Operational Capability (IOC) plus 10 years. ' Threat
capabilities 'are those of Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces and Soviet surrogate forces
increasingly liable to be encountered in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin
America. In using the term "Soviet" to modify a threat capability or feature,
attribution of a comparable capability or feature to a surrogate force is implicit.
2. As with all Soviet military doctrine, the principles of defense against
amphibious assault have as their goal the creation of conditions which will allow the
Soviet commander to initiate decisive action while denying the landing force
commander this same capability. In furtherance of this goal, the Soviet defense is
based upon high intensity mobility operations utilizing large numbers of tanks and
armored fighting vehicles, extensive use of supporting arms and tactical aviation, and
echeloned defense in depth deployed in an integrated combined arms concept.
3. As an outgrowth of this concept of defense, certain Soviet weapons systems
will be of particular concern. The mobility, firepower and protection offered by tanks
and armored fighting vehicles will afford the Soviet commander an advantage against
Marine landing forces as they are presently equipped. This capability will be greatly
enhanced by the introduction of the T-72/T-80 Series tanks with their vastly improved
armor protection, power plant, armament, and fire control systems. More than 200
such vehicles will be encountered in a representative motorized rifle division, the
primary tactical element in defense against an amphibious assault. Infantry mobility
and fighting capability will also increase with the introduction of improved armored
fighting vehicles of the BMP, BMD, BTR family, more than 400 of which will be
encountered in the motorized rifle divison. The Soviet commander will also enjoy an
increased capability to employ air and artillery-deiiverea ordnance against the landing
force. Tactical aviation will expand dramatically with the widespread use of attack
helicopters such as the Mi-8 (HIP), the Mi-24 (HIND) and their successors, as well as
fixed wing attack aircraft such as the MIG-27 (FLOGGER-D) and its replacement, the
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"ground support" fighter. Artillery will increase in both numbers and mobility, with the
self-propelled 122mm and 152mm gun/howitzers playing an expanding role. An added
dimension of serious proportions will be the Soviet capability and doctrinal willingness
to employ nuclear munitions and conduct chemical operations utilizing a variety of
incapacitating and lethal aeents.
C. EXISTING/PLANNED CAPABILITIES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION .
1. Existing .
a. M60 Al Tank;
b. TOW weapon system mounted on a 1/4 ton truck;
c. Dragon antitank weapon system;
d. Light Antitank Assault Weapon (LAAW);
e. Towed and self-propelled artillery (105mm, 155mm, 8in);
f. Fixed and rotary-winged aircraft;
g. Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)/Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT);
h. Foreign Light Armored Vehicles.
2. Planned .
a. XM1 Tank;
b. Improved TOW on 5/4 ton truck (HMMWV);
c. Improved LAAW;
d. Improved artillery (M198, M110A2, Copperhead);
e. Aircraft ordnance (Laser Maverick);
f. Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV/LVT (X));
g. Mobile Protected Gun (MPG) (near term and far term);
h. Mobile Protected Weapons System (MPWS).
D. ASSESSMENT OF NEED .
1. The Need . Maneuver/Mechanized warfare is highly mobile and requires a
family of lightweight armored vehicles to increase the tactical and strategic mobility
of amphibious and Rapid Deployment Forces. The weapons systems on these vehicles
will also fill the need for additional firepower on the battlefield.
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2. Deficiencies in Existing/Planned Capabilities .
a. Tanks are not helicopter transportable, therefore limiting their force
mobility, and are less agile than a light armored vehicle (LAV). For a given tactical or
strategic lift capability, more LAV's can be lifted than the heavier tanks, thus
enhancing mobility.
b. The family of truck-mounted or individually fired antitank missiles
lack crew protection from ballistic projectiles, NBC detection and protection, and are
less agile and mobile than an LAV.
c. Dragon, LAAW, and Improved LAAW provide an antiarmor capability
but without a high degree of mobility, agility and protection for the crew.
d. During the initial phases of an amphibious assault, artillery fires are
not immediately available to provide responsive support fire. Artillery mobility for the
direct fire role is limited and the projected Copperhead's capability is limited by
adverse weather conditions and availability of laser designator personnel and
equipment.
e. Aircraft, including the antitank configured helicopters, are capable
weapons, but their effectiveness is degraded in adverse weather conditions. The
antitank role may be diminished due to priority demands or other degradation factors.
f. A variety of foreign and domestic vehicles and weapon systems exist
or are planned which individually meet some of the requirements for a specific-variant
of an LAV. However, the required mixture of these vehicles (e.g., IFVs, MPWS, APCs,
etc.) would be of such a dissimilar nature thai training, support and combat
interoperability would be highly complicated. Additionally, the aggregate of the mix
would not provide the total capabilities required. Therefore, a common vehicle
platform from which needed variants can be derived is required. For example, the
MPWS and MPG will not provide variant capabilities nor will they meet the required
LAV IOC.
g. The existing/planned LVT's are not helicopter transportable, and have
limited strategic air transportability. The existing LVT does not provide significant fire
support.
3. Exploitable Technological Opportunity . There exists today foreign and
U. S. manufactured verucles which, with proper armament/ancillary equipment, could
fill the requirements for an LAV family. Currently available weapon systems will be
considered in the evaluation and selection of the primary candidate to meet the desired
IOC of 1983. However, to increase the firepower and mobility of the Marine Corps, as
directed by the Consolidated Guidance, subsequent Pre-Planned Product Improvements
are planned starting in FY82 to acquire additional variants such as the anti-tank,
command and control and air defense.
k. Force Size . The LAV will be initially introduced into a battalion-sized unit
in order to develop tactics. Ultimate organization of the LAV will be adjusted as
determined by operational experience and pending a structure review.
E. CONSTRAINTS .
1. Timing of Need . The need for the LAV is immediate. The acquisition
strategy must allow for the earliest possible IOC within the framework of the DoD
system acquisition procedures.
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2. Relative Priority Within the Mission Area . The LAV is a unique opportunity
for the Marine Corps to add additional firepower and mobility to its RDF posture
through a near-term procurement of an off-the-shelf vehicle. Therefore, the priority
for the LAV ranks number one in the Land Warfare area and number three, behind
increased amphibious lift and assault amphibians, in the Amphibious Warfare area.
3. Resources . In order to obtain the earliest possible IOC for this system,
Congress has initiated added R&D funding to permit accelerated evaluation and
selection of an acceptaole candidate. The current funding profile (constant dollars) for
the years 1981-86 is depicted in the following table to initiate the total anticipated
procurement of approximately 750 vehicles to outfit and support three LAV battalions.
iscal Year 81 82 83 lii 8_5 86
NUMBER OF
VEHICLES 72 108 128 128 128
PMC (M$)* ^9.9 72.0 82.9 84.3 85.9
RDT&E (M$) 17.0 10.2 11.6 10.3 5.S 2.0
Includes provisioning and ammo.
k. Logistics. Safety. Health. Energy. Environment and Mansower
Considerations .
a. Logistics . The current and projected Combat Service Support (CSS)
procedures and structure will be adequate to support the introduction of the LAV with
minor adjustments. A logistics support analysis will address the specific adjustments
necessary to support the LAV units, to include probable contractor support.
b. Manpower . Initial manpower requirements are estimated to range
from 900 to 950 enlisted Marines, and 46 officers per battalion {\kk vehicles).
Manpower analyses will be conducted throughout the acquisition process to optimize the
numbers and skills requirements for operational, maintenance, and logistics support of
the LAV. A plan to restructure Marine ground forces to accommodate the LAV
battalions including an analysis of a battalion T/O has been initiated. Once this analysis
is completed, training will commence to meet the LAV IOC of 1983. Maintenance
personnel will ultimately depend upon the specifics of the vehicle system chosen. No
adverse impact is anticipated for any affected OccFld. It is anticipated that
maintenance staffing will be similar to that of organizations such as motor transport or
tracked vehicle battalions. The first two LAV battalions will be manned within
currently programmed end strengths. Manpower for the third battalion will be
programmed for FY86.
c. Safety. Health. Energy and Environment . Due to limited impact on
these areas, no constraints are envisioned.
5. NATO/DoD Rationalization. Standardization and Interoperability
(RSI) . The equipment to be purcnasea is to be an "oi:-:he-sheif" proauct. Competition
will be open to both foreign and domestic sources. RSI considerations will be
fundamental to the evaluation and selection process and particularly to later
developmental activities contributing to product improvement.
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6. Critical Interdependences . The program will be constrained by the
availability of currently avaiiaoie off-the-shelf vehicles and weapon systems.
F. RESOURCES AND SCHEDULE TO MEET NEXT MILESTONE .
Due to the urgency of the need and the acceleration of the procurement process
of an off-the-shelf vehicle, aspects of the Milestone I and II requirements have been
consolidated to construct an LAV Acquisition Strategy. The request for proposals for
candidate vehicles will be released during early 3rd Quarter FY81 and the six month
test period will commence during the 1st Quarter FY82. The best available
vehicle/weapon system will be selected by the Source Selection Authority and proposed
at a Milestone III schedulec during the 4th Quarter FYS2. The estimated funding
projected to meet Milestone III is $17.OM.
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APPENDIX B
LAV-2 5 TECHNICAL PUBLICATION FIELDING DATES
As stated in Chapter II, the goal for fielding LAV-25
technical publications was October-December 1984. Listed
below are the actual LAV-25 publication fielding dates in
chronological order. The following abbreviations are used:



























































































USA/USMC joint program office
established.
Phase I (Testing) RFP released.
Phase I (Testing) contract
awarded.
Phase II (LAV-2 5 Production) RFP
released.
Revised LAV ROC approved.
Phase II (LAV-25 production)
contract awarded to CCC for DDGM.
Company A, First LAV Battalion
is activated at 29 Palms,
California.
First LAV-25 production delivery.
Army terminates their portion of
the LAV-2 5 program.
Initial delivery of 3 LAV-25 's to
ITS.
Revised procurement profile is
approved.
Second LAV Battalion, Second
Marine Division is activated at













2 3 September 1987
May 1987




Company A, First LAV Battalion to
Company A, Third LAV Battalion.
First LAV Battalion, First Marine
Division is activated at
Pendleton, California.
Emergency LAV-2 5 spare parts
procurement requirement
indentif ied.
Emergency LAV-2 5 spare parts
procurement disapproved for lack
of competition.
Competitive RFP issued. No
responses received.
Delco asks for 120 day RFP
extension. CCC agrees to submit
a proposal.
CCC proposal received.
Contracts awarded to CCC and
Delco for LAV-2 5 emergency spare
parts.
Third LAV Battalion, Seventh
Marine Amphibious Brigade is
activated at 29 Palms,
California.
Fourth LAV Battalion, Fourth
Marine Division is activated at
Camp Pendleton, California.
Last of the LAV-25' s is delivered
to the Marine Corps.
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